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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 




ESTATE OF ALBERT P. SCHULTZ, BY BONNIE SCHULTZ, REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 v.  
 
 MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD; POSTMASTER GENERAL 
 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:13-cv-01363) 
 




 MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 
 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:14-cv-01159) 
 
       Estate of Albert P. Schultz, by Bonnie Schultz, Representative*,  
   
    Appellant 
 
*(Amended Pursuant to Clerk Order dated May 22, 2015) 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Nos. 2:13-cv-01363 & 2:14-cv-01159) 
 District Judges:  Honorable Alan N. Bloch & Nora Barry Fischer 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2016 
 Before: FUENTES,** KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
                                                 
** Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July 18, 2016. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
The Estate of Albert P. Schultz (the “Estate”) seeks review of two District Court 
orders, which like the underlying dispute itself—a disability discrimination case 
involving the United States Postal Service that dates back to the 1990s1—have a 
somewhat tangled procedural history.  Before reaching the merits of the Estate’s appeal, 
we determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
do not.  As a result, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Greatly condensed, the cases on appeal began as two attorneys’ fees proceedings 
brought by the Estate before the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Merit Board”), an 
agency that serves as an “independent adjudicator of federal employment disputes.”2  
After the first case (“Schultz I”) ended in a loss, the Estate both petitioned for judicial 
review and filed the second fee case before the Merit Board (“Schultz II”)—which, in 
                                                 
*** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 We have reviewed at least three appeals from prior incarnations of this case.  See C.A. 
No. 10-2843 (judgment order entered June 20, 2011); Estate of Schultz v. Potter, 349 F. 
App’x 712 (3d Cir. 2009); Estate of Schultz v. Potter, 285 F. App’x 886 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Our 2009 decision contains a brief summary of the late Albert Schultz’s charge of 
disability discrimination against the Postal Service.  See Schultz, 349 F. App’x at 715–16.    
2 Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 600 (2012). 
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turn, also ended in a loss and in another petition for review.3  After some false starts, both 
petitions for review ended up before Judge Fischer in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania under separate docket numbers.  
The Merit Board, named as a defendant on each docket, moved under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 42(a) to consolidate the two cases, which it described as “really the same case.”4  The 
Merit Board also asked to be dismissed as an improper defendant.  In an order entered on 
each docket, Judge Fischer consolidated the cases, dismissing/closing Schultz II and 
directing all further filings to be made on Schultz I.  In the same order, Judge Fischer 
denied a motion to remand filed by the Estate and dismissed the Merit Board as a 
defendant from both cases.5  The consolidated Schultz I was then assigned to Judge 
Bloch.  A reconsideration motion filed on both dockets was denied separately by Judge 
Bloch on Schultz I and Judge Fischer on the now-closed Schultz II.  The Estate then filed 
a notice of appeal in Schultz II. 6  
Before turning to the appeal proper, we address one more relevant part of the 
proceedings before the District Court.  Eight days after the Estate appealed Schultz II, 
Judge Bloch ruled on several motions in Schultz I that had been filed prior to the 
                                                 
3 Schultz v. U.S. Postal Serv., 120 M.S.P.R. 652 (M.S.P.B. 2014) (table); Schultz v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 117 M.S.P.R. 698 (M.S.P.B. 2012) (table). 
4 JA 393. 
5 See Schultz v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Nos. 13-1363 & 14-1159, 2014 WL 7015990, at *1–
3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014).   
6 The Estate specifically disclaims any interest in appellate review of Schultz I.  See, e.g., 
Appellant’s Br. 4.  Relatedly, while it is somewhat unclear from the record whether the 
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consolidation.  Significantly, Judge Bloch granted the Estate’s cross motion for summary 
judgment “to the extent that it seeks remand to the [Merit] Board for a determination of 
attorney fees incurred in connection with [the Estate’s] underlying compliance action.”7  
The case was, as a result, remanded to the Merit Board for further proceedings.   
The Estate’s appeal presents a two-part appellate jurisdiction question, which we 
“resolve . . . before reaching the merits.”8  We first determine whether Judge Fischer’s 
order was initially appealable.  If it was not, we decide whether intervening developments 
in the case affected its appealability.      
We conclude that Judge Fischer’s order was not appealable when it was originally 
issued.  “In general, we may only hear appeals from final judgments and from certain 
prescribed interlocutory orders of the district courts.”9  A decision is final under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 when it ends the case as to all claims and all parties.10  While Judge 
Fischer’s order dismissed the Merit Board “with prejudice” as an improper defendant, the 
claims against it remained lodged against the Postmaster General in the consolidated 
Schultz I; the District Court continued to adjudicate the remaining claims and otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                             
Estate seeks review of both orders denying reconsideration or just Judge Fischer’s, our 
disposition today would be the same in either scenario.   
7 Schultz v. Donahoe, No. 13-1363, 2015 WL 1491754, at *4–6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 
2015). 
8 Cunningham v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 392 F.3d 567, 570 (3d Cir. 2004).   
9 Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585 (3d Cir. 1999). 
10 See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 1991). 
5 
 
to take action in the case.11  And in the absence of finality, “[a]n order granting or 
denying consolidation is a nonappealable interlocutory order.”12     
There is one more avenue by which we might have jurisdiction.  In this Circuit, 
the Cape May Greene rule allows for a prematurely filed appeal to “ripen upon the 
court’s disposal of the remaining claims.”13  Assuming without deciding that Judge 
Bloch’s Schultz I decision resolved the rest of the case, we have held that Cape May 
Greene “is not applicable to discovery or similar interlocutory orders.”14  Judge Fischer’s 
order contained both interlocutory and dispositive elements, but is challenged only with 
                                                 
11 See Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (“A final judgment is one which ends 
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Estate appears to argue that the 
cases were not truly consolidated, and thus that Judge Fischer’s order was actually “final” 
for Schultz II.  The Estate further attempts to distinguish the two cases by labeling Schultz 
I the “fee petition case” and Schultz II the “settlement agreement enforcement case.”  
Appellant’s JD Resp. 2.  But we do not perceive such a division between the two matters.  
The Estate’s second amended complaint in Schultz I referenced the settlement agreement 
and the fees due in connection with the agreement.  (See, e.g., JA 288–89.)  And Judge 
Bloch’s merits decision “in fact[] remand[ed] [the Estate’s] case . . . for reconsideration 
and a determination of attorney fees due for the compliance action.”  Schultz, 2015 WL 
1491754, at *6.  To the extent the line of authority descended from Bogosian v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), is applicable here, the indication that the cases were 
not intended to be kept separate is an additional factor weighing against allowing appeal 
before all consolidated actions were resolved.  
12 Brace v. O‘Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 240 n.9 (3d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). 
To the extent that the “collateral order” doctrine might save the appeal, the Estate has not 
argued for its application here.  See United States v. Chelsea Towers, Inc., 404 F.2d 329, 
330 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam) (suggesting that collateral order doctrine does not apply 
to consolidation).  There is otherwise no indication that Judge Fischer’s order would be 
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
13 Adapt of Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Cape 
May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184–85 (3d Cir. 1983)).   
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regard to the former, not the latter.  The Estate does not contend that the Merit Board was 
a proper defendant for reasons unrelated to its concern about the full scope of the 
consolidation.  Thus, Cape May Greene would not cause the notice of appeal to ripen.  
In sum, we conclude that Judge Fischer’s order was not appealable, and has not 
become so due to intervening events.  It follows that the orders denying reconsideration 
were also not appealable.  Because we lack jurisdiction, the appeal will be dismissed.   
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Id. at 365. 
